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Why the CFPB Should Reconsider Dodd-Frank's
Prohibition on Yield Spread Premiums
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank) is touted as the most "sweeping" change to United
States financial regulation since the Great Depression.' Among many
other changes, Dodd-Frank changes the operation and regulation of
residential mortgage brokers. This Note evaluates the provisions in
Title XIV of Dodd-Frank that ban the use of a payment called a yield
spread premium (YSP).
The pertinent sections of Title XIV were passed in an effort to
keep mortgage closing costs as low as possible and to prevent mortgage
broker abuses. These provisions have received significant criticism
from the mortgage industry. In addition to exploring these provisions,
this Note will evaluate several criticisms of the YSP ban and offer an
alternative approach for the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(CFPB) to consider. This Note contends that the ban on YSPs is an
overreaction to evidence that these payments were used abusively, and
that there are alternatives that would maintain the benefits associated
with YSPs while eliminating the dangers.
Part II gives a short history of YSP law 2 and the changes
following the passage of Dodd-Frank 3 and Federal Reserve Board (Fed)
rulemakings.4 Part III details some of the primary criticisms of the YSP
ban.s Next, Part IV of this Note will offer some reasons why the
prohibition on YSPs deserves reconsideration by the CFPB.6 Lastly,
Part V offers an alternative to a complete ban on YSPs and explains
how this approach will maintain the benefits associated with YSPs and
protect against abuses.
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part Il.B.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A YSP is a payment from a lender to a mortgage originator,
when a residential mortgage loan is closed that is either (1) purchased
by the mortgage originator at a wholesale rate and sold to the consumer
at the retail rate (par rate), or (2) the mortgage originator purchases a
loan and sells it to the consumer at a rate above the par rate.' A YSP
can most easily be thought of as reverse or negative points that allow
the borrower to defer upfront costs in exchange for a higher interest rate
on their mortgage loan. 9  As the interest rate increases above the
broker's wholesale rate, the amount of the YSP increases as well.'0
A YSP can be a useful tool for homebuyers, providing them
with greater flexibility in financing their mortgage broker's
compensation." Ways in which a YSP can be utilized include: (1)
compensation for the mortgage broker;12 (2) application toward a
borrower's closing expenses;' 3 (3) cash back return to the borrower;14
(4) payment for seller closing concessions; 5 or (5) in some combination
of the preceding options.' 6
Previous to the mortgage broker compensation changes, brokers
could receive compensation from two sources: the borrower and the
lender.17 The borrower could choose to pay all the costs associated with
their mortgage closing to the mortgage broker directly.' 8 Alternatively,
the lending institution could compensate the mortgage broker in part or
8. See Alan M. Tarter & Christopher J. Gulotta, Yield Spread Premium, THE
GULOTTA LAw GROUP (Jan. 19, 1999), http://thegulottalawgroup.com/pub_yield-spred.htm.
9. See id.
10. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 289, 292 (2007).
11. See Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification
of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and
Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052, 53,054 (Oct.
18, 2001) (to be codified at 35 C.F.R. pt. 3500) [hereinafter RESPA's 2001 Statement of
Policy] ("The availability of [a YSP] fosters homeownership.").
12. Ron Gitter, Has Dodd-Frank Slayed the Mortgage Monster?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 15, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ron-gitter/has-doddfrank-slayed-
the-_b 835246.html (listing some common uses for YSP proceeds).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Tarter & Gulotta, supra note 8.
18. Id.
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entirely with a YSP.19 Most frequently, borrowers chose to compensate
their mortgage brokers with a combination of the two sources of
payment.20  This practice of splitting broker compensation is called
dual-compensation because the mortgage broker receives their total
compensation from two sources: the borrower and the lender. When
used, the YSP was typically the largest component of a mortgage
broker's compensation and significantly offset upfront fees.21  Related
to the prohibition on YSPs and dual-compensation, Dodd-Frank also
prohibits a practice called mortgage steering.22 Mortgage steering
occurs when a mortgage originator or broker steers or directs a borrower
into a loan that is not in the borrower's best interest because the broker
will receive greater compensation.2 3
Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, authority for the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) was transferred to the CFPB on July 21, 2010, when the CFPB
came into existence. As part of that transfer, Dodd-Frank granted the
CFPB explicit authority to waive or create exemptions to the YSP
prohibition if it finds such action would be in the consumers' best
interest. 24  The CFPB should reconsider Dodd-Frank's ban on YSPs
primarily because consumers have fewer choices available to finance
their mortgage closing costs, 2 5  and banning YSPs will place
19. Id.
20. See Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and
Sub-Optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence 5 (Nat'1 Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16007, (2010), [hereinafter Diagnosing Consumer
Confusion], available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6007.
21. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 291-92.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) ("For any residential mortgage loan,
no mortgage originator shall receive from any person and no person shall pay to a mortgage
originator, directly or indirectly, compensation that varies based on the terms of the loan
(other than the amount of the principal).").
23. See Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 58,534 (Sept. 24, 2010) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
24. Congress prohibited YSPs and dual compensation structures and in the very same
breath gave the CFPB authority to limit or waive these prohibitions. See 15 U.S.C. §
1639b(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) ("[T]he Bureau may, by rule, waive or provide exemptions
to this clause if the Bureau determines that such waiver or exemption is in the interest of
consumers and in the public interest.").
25. Dodd-Frank and Mortgage Reform - Fixing What Isn't Broken, Exclusive Capital
Consultants, Inc. (Feb. 21, 2011), http://exclusivecapitalconsultants.com/dodd-frank-and-
mortgage-reform-fixing-what-isn%E2%80%99t-broken [hereinafter Fixing What Isn't
Broken].
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homeownership outside the reach of some qualified buyers.26 Many
commentators and mortgage brokers believe the rigid changes to
compensation signal an unnecessary overreaction since the number of
brokers has dramatically decreased 27 and, presumably, many of the
"rotten apples" have left the market.2" Moreover, Dodd-Frank created
barriers to keep the unscrupulous mortgage brokers from reentering the
market and returning to abusive practices.29 Prohibiting YSPs runs
counter to RESPA's policy regarding closing cost control, and more
importantly, the ban on YSPs is incompatible with the overall goal of
Dodd-Frank and the CFPB; both were intended to help consumers and
protect them from abuses, not to eliminate borrower options related to
the home financing process.
26. See infra Part IV.C.
27. See Chuck Marunde, Traditional Brokers Quitting, THE FUTURE REAL ESTATE
AGENT: THE VIRTUAL AGENT, http://www.futurerealestateagent.com/traditional-
brokerage/traditional-brokers-quitting (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) ("This recession is not
good news for real estate agents, but when the dust settles, consumers of real estate services
will be left with agents who are full time professionals committed to their clients. For
consumers this means agents with more experience, better track records, and greater
longevity than the 'flock' of licensees who got licensed and made money in easier times. I
also believe that more consumer oriented brokers will evolve, which is also to the benefit of
consumers."); Lew Sichelman, Weeding Out Bad Brokers, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 8, 2011, 12:00
AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/realestate/buy/sc-cons-0908-mortgage-
brokers-20110908,0,5135802.story ("William Matthews, [President of the Illinois State
Regulatory Registry,] believes that rogue mortgage brokers have been removed from the
lending business.").
28. See Gitter, supra note 12 ("Although many of the rotten apples that facilitated the
housing crash are gone, and in many respects, the originators have themselves to blame for
the legislative overreaction, those remaining in loan origination are being forced to accept
changes that may no longer have relevance in today's restricted lending environment.").
29. Dodd-Frank requires mortgage originators to submit their loan documents to the
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry with a unique identifier number. The
identifier number allows the CFPB to oversee the activities of independent mortgage
originators. The Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry enables potential
borrowers to see if their mortgage originator has been subject to disciplinary action by the
CFPB. 12 U.S.C. § 5101(Supp. IV 2010). Dodd-Frank increases disclosures requirements
for mortgage brokers. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(16)-(19) (Supp. IV 2010).
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II. THE STATE OF YSP LAW
A. A Brief History of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
Congress passed RESPA in 1974.30 The U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was responsible for enacting
and enforcing regulations under RESPA,31 codified in Regulation X."
Congress enacted RESPA after a report revealed the rampant use of
kickbacks among real estate professionals.33 The report concluded that
these kickbacks increased the cost of a home purchase for consumers.34
In an effort to keep these costs as low as possible and facilitate
consumer comparison, RESPA required the standardized disclosure of
settlement costs for all federally related mortgage loans.35
As enacted, RESPA employed an indirect, multi-pronged
approach to keep settlement costs low, rather than setting explicit
maximum fee limits or rate restrictions.36 Two of RESPA's prongs are
30. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. In 1970, Congress enacted the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970. Pub. L. No.
91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (1970). This Act vested the HUD Secretary and Administrator of
Veteran's Affairs (VA) with temporary authority to place rate caps for settlement costs on
federally ensured mortgages. The Act required that the HUD Secretary and VA
Administrator conduct a study to determine how to reduce the cost of residential real estate
financing. Among other issues, the report focused on kickbacks, finding "an elaborate
system of referral fees, kickbacks, rebates, commissions, and the like as an inducement to
those firms and individuals who direct the placement of business. These practices are widely
employed, rarely inure to the benefit of the home buyer, and generally increase total
settlement costs." The results of the report, released in 1972, led to the enactment of RESPA
two years later. Section 8 of RESPA prohibits kickbacks in real estate transactions. S.
COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 92d CONG., REP. ON MORTGAGE
SETTLEMENT COSTS (2d. Sess. 1972).
34. Id.; see also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No.93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a)) ("The Congress finds that significant reforms
in the real estate settlement process are needed to insure that consumers throughout the
Nation are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive
practices that have developed in some areas of the country.").
35. Use of HUD-1 or HUD-1A settlement statements, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8 (2011)
(requiring that the settlement agent give the borrowers a HUD-1 statement that itemizes all
the charges and fees associated with a federally related mortgages). "Federally related" is
defined at id. § 3500.2.
36. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 298 ("The Committee ultimately chose
the [multi-pronged strategy] stating that outright rate regulations were disfavored so long as
other solutions were available. Thus, RESPA as ultimately enacted in 1974 rejected rate
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of particular significance to YSP regulation. First, section 8 prohibits
the payment of "any fee, kickback, or thing of value" for the referral of
a settlement service, but subsection (c) provides an exception for
"bona fide salary or compensation." 39  Second, the statute requires
disclosure of all settlement charges, including YSPs, 40 imposed upon
the borrower in a timely and standardized manner.4 1
In the 1992 Regulation X amendment, HUD explicitly avoided
categorizing YSPs as either compensation or kickbacks,42 only requiring
disclosure of YSPs. Critics and trade organizations disagreed about
how to categorize YSPs. Critics characterized YSPs as kickbacks,
prohibited under RESPA, and trade organizations insisted YSPs fell
under RESPA's Section 8 exception for bona fide compensation.43
In HUD's regulatory silence, courts began interpreting the
legality of YSPs under RESPA themselves. In practice, YSPs were
difficult for courts to categorize,44 and courts were split on the legality
of YSPs. 45 Some courts held that the YSPs were permissible as a matter
regulation and relied instead on a multi-pronged strategy for constraining the costs of
settlement services."); see also S. REP. No. 93-866, at 4-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546, 6550 (finding that federalism and efficiency were additional reasons to
reject a direct rate regulation).
37. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 298 ("For purposes of the controversy
over yield spread premiums, the most important elements of this strategy are disclosure
requirements and a legal prohibition against . .. kickbacks and unearned fees. . .
38. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (Supp. IV 2010).
39. Id. § 2607(c)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting ... the
payment to any person of a bona fide salary or compensation or other payment for goods or
facilities actually furnished or for services actually performed.").
40. In 1992, HUD amended Regulation X in response to the increased usage of YSPs
in mortgage financing and explicitly required the disclosure of YSPs on the HUD-1
Settlement Statement. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500, app. B, para. 12 (2011) ("Also, any other fee or
payment received by the mortgage broker from either the lender or the borrower arising
from the initial funding transaction, including a servicing release premium or yield spread
premium, is to be noted on the Good Faith Estimate and listed in the 800 series of the HUD-
1 Settlement Statement.").
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (a)-(b) (Supp. IV 2010) ("The [CFPB] shall publish a single,
integrated disclosure for mortgage loan transactions (including real estate settlement
costs) . . .. The purpose of such model disclosure shall be to facilitate compliance with the
disclosure requirements of this chapter and of the Truth in Lending Act, and to aid the
borrower or lessee in understanding the transaction by utilizing readily understandable
language to simplify the technical nature of disclosures. [. . .] The form prescribed under
this section shall be completed and made available for inspection by the borrower at or
before settlement by the person conducting the settlement.").
42. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 299.
43. See id. at 289.
44. See id. at 299-311.
45. See Culpepper v. Inland Mortg. Corp., 953 F. Supp. 367, 372 (N.D. Ala. 1997)
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of law,46 while others held that they were impermissible.4 7 In an effort
to resolve this uncertainty, Congress ordered HUD to clarify its position
on YSPs, and, in response, HUD released a Statement of Policy in
1999.48 HUD released a second Statement of Policy in 2001 to resolve
remaining ambiguities following the holding in Culpepper v. Irwin
Mortgage Corp.49
In 1999 and 2001, HUD stated that YSPs were not illegal per se,
and offered courts a two-prong test to determine the validity of a
specific YSP. 50 The test required (1) that a mortgage broker provided a
service to the borrower, and (2) that the mortgage brokers' total
compensation, including any YSP, had a "reasonable relationship to the
market value of the goods or services provided."5 1  HUD provided a
non-inclusive list of "covered services and goods" in these statements.
The definition of "covered services and goods" was so broad 52 that
mortgage brokers nearly always provided some covered service to
potential buyers, thus shifting the focus of the test entirely to the second
prong.
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 132 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Culpepper 1]
("Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct that the yield spread premium technically falls within
the definition of a 'referral fee,' the more specific exception for 'payment for goods' in §
2607(c) renders the premium permissible as a matter of law."); Culpepper v. Inland Mortg.
Corp., 144 F.3d 717, 720 (11th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter Culpepper 11]; Barbosa v. Target
Mortg. Corp., 968 F.Supp. 1548, 1552 (S.D.Fla.1997) (holding that YSPs were permissible
as a matter of law).
46. See Culpepper 1, 132 F.3d at 696, 699.
47. See Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., 491 F.3d 1260 (2007) [hereinafter Culpepper
III] (holding that YSPs were prohibited under RESPA and they did not fall under the
Section 8 exception).
48. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Statement of Policy 1999-1
Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,080 (Mar. 1, 1999),
[hereinafter RESPA's 1999 Statement of Policy].
49. See Culpepper III, 491 F.3d at 1267 (finding RESPA's 1999 Statement of Policy
ambiguous and misapplying).
50. See RESPA's 1999 Statement of Policy, supra note 48, at 10,084.
51. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(g)(2) (2011).
52. The following is a portion of the list of covered services provided in the 1999
Statement of Policy: "(a) Taking information from the borrower and filling out the
application; (b) Analyzing the prospective borrower's income and debt and pre-qualifying
the prospective borrower to determine the maximum mortgage that the prospective borrower
can afford; (c) Educating the prospective borrower in the home buying and financing
process, advising the borrower about the different types of loan products available, and
demonstrating how closing costs and monthly payments could vary under each product; (d)
Collecting financial information (tax returns, bank statements) and other related documents
that are part of the application process ..... RESPA's 1999 Statement of Policy, supra note
48, at 10,085.
53. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 303 ("[M]ortgage brokers will almost
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As to the second prong, HUD said that the total compensation,
including any YSP, should be reasonably related to the value of the
goods and services actually provided.5 4 In making this determination,
HUD instructed courts to consider objective factors such as broker
compensation in a specific market and subjective factors such as the
amount of work or difficulty presented by a particular loan." For
instance, some applicants, perhaps those with lower credit ratings,
higher levels of debt, or uncertain employment, would require
additional work from their mortgage broker to qualify for particular
loan programs.56 According to HUD's 1999 and 2001 guidance, it was
appropriate and reasonable for a broker to receive greater compensation
when the situation demanded more effort on the part of the mortgage
broker.57  Likewise, a court should have considered the particular
demands of a wholesale lender on the broker. If a particular lender
required more than other lenders, that additional effort should have
factored into the reasonableness determination as well.
Soon after HUD issued its 2001 Statement of Policy several
circuit courts held that private cases challenging YSPs could not be
treated as class actions because the two-prong analysis required a case-
by-case analysis.59  This prohibition on class certification severely
limited the viability of any future YSP litigation because of the
relatively small amounts involved in any one case and the limited
resources of individual borrowers.o
B. Dodd-Frank's Changes to YSP Law
Several sections of Dodd-Frank restrict the amount and sources
of mortgage broker compensation. Section 1403(c)(4)(A) of Dodd-
Frank provides that "[n]o provision ... shall be construed as permitting
any yield spread premium ... that would, for any residential mortgage
invariably have performed services in connection with the origination of their loans .. ").
54. RESPA's 2001 Statement of Policy, supra note 11, at 53,054.
55. See id. at 53,055.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 302 n. 28.
60. See id at 305 n. 34 ("While theoretically possible, successful individualized private
litigation over YSPs is likely to be rare, but as a practical matter, such cases are unlikely to
be brought.").
330 [Vol. 16
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loan, permit the total amount of direct and indirect compensation from
all sources permitted to a mortgage originator to vary based on the
terms of the loan (other than the amount of the principal)."61 Section
1403(c)(2) prohibits the common practice of dual-compensation for
mortgage brokers.62 Section 1403(c)(3)(A) prohibits mortgage
originators from steering borrowers into a non-Qualified Mortgage loan
when the borrower qualifies for a Qualified Mortgage.63  In section
1412(b)(2)(A)(vii), Dodd-Frank indirectly limits the amount of
compensation a mortgage broker can receive on a Qualified Mortgage
by placing a three percent cap on all points and fees.64 A Qualified
Mortgage is a residential home mortgage where the ability-to-repay is
presumed as long as the loan meets the demands of section 1412 of
Dodd-Frank, including a three percent cap on all points and fees.
Lenders are not required to make Qualified Mortgages, but are strongly
incentivized to do so. 65
In addition to limiting the amount and source of income, Dodd-
Frank placed increased disclosure and reporting requirements on
mortgage brokers. 66  Dodd-Frank required the establishment of a
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry (NMLS) in an
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c) (Supp. IV 2010).
62. See id § 1639b(c)(2)(A) ("For any mortgage loan, a mortgage originator may not
receive from any person other than the consumer and no person, other than the consumer ...
any origination fee or charge except bona fide third party charges . . . ."); id. §
1639b(c)(2)(B) ("Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a mortgage originator may receive
from a person other than the consumer an origination fee or charge, and a person other than
the consumer may pay a mortgage originator an origination fee or charge if (i) the mortgage
originator does not receive any compensation directly from the consumer; and (ii) the
consumer does not make an upfront payment of discount points, origination points, or
fees . . . .").
63. See id § 1639b(c)(1) ("For any residential mortgage loan, no mortgage originator
shall receive from any person and no person shall pay to a mortgage originator, directly or
indirectly, compensation that varies based on the terms of the loan (other than the amount of
the principal).").
64. Id. § 1639c (amending TILA to reflect a presumption of the ability to repay if the
loan in question is a Qualified Mortgage).
65. Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(16) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring that disclosures include the full
first month payment and fully indexed monthly payment for variable rate residential
mortgages with escrow accounts); id. § 1638(a)(17) (requiring that disclosure include the
aggregate amount of settlement charges for all services and the approximate wholesale rate
of the funds); id § 1638(a)(18) (requiring that disclosures include the aggregate amount of
fees paid to a mortgage originator); and id. § 1638(a)(19) (requiring disclosure include the
total amount interest that the borrower will pay over the life of the loan as a percentage of
the principal, loan assuming there are no extra payments applied to the loan balance).
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effort to enhance consumer protection and reduce fraud. NMLS was
implemented the year following the enactment of Dodd-Frank.67 All
mortgage professionals, including those within depository institutions
and their affiliates, are required to submit their loan documents to
NMLS with a unique identifier. 68  The identifier enables NMLS to
oversee the activities of mortgage professionals by tracking disciplinary
actions taken against the broker, consumer complaints, and their
licensing information. 69 NMLS has also created a consumer website
where prospective borrowers can look up any mortgage professional,
including mortgage brokers, to see where the individual is licensed.
Additionally, NMLS anticipates adding disciplinary information to the
website for consumer access in 2012. Dodd-Frank granted the CFPB
Director back-up authority to create and maintain a similar registry if
the Director finds that NMLS is failing to maintain sufficient oversight
over mortgage professionals, including mortgage brokers.7 1
The effective dates of Dodd-Frank's Title XIV provisions vary,
but most become effective when the CFPB issues its final rules. Dodd-
Frank required that the CFPB prescribe any final rules within an
eighteen-month period following the designated transfer date, by
January 21, 2013.72 The rules should become effective no later than
twelve months after the issuance of the final rule, January 21, 2014 at
the latest.73 If the CFPB does not issue a final regulation within
eighteen months after the designated transfer date, those sections
without final rules will become effective as written in Dodd-Frank on
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. IV 2010).
68. Id.
69. Id. §§ 5101, 5108.
70. As of Sept. 2011 there were almost 16,500 licensed mortgage companies, 109,000
licensed mortgage brokers, 10,500 licensed depositories are listed online at NMLS's
consumer access website. NATIONWIDE MORTGAGE LICENSING SYs. & REGISTRY:
CONSUMER ACCESS, http://nmlsconsumeraccess.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
71. See 12 U.S.C. § 5108 (Supp. IV 2010) (granting back-up authority to the CFPB's
Director to establish and maintain a registry at any time if the Director finds the
"Nationwide Mortgage Licensing and Registry System is failing to meet the requirements
and purposes of this chapter for a comprehensive licensing, supervisory, and tracking
system for loan originators.").
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2010).
73. See id. The effective dates for provisions under Title XIV of Dodd-Frank are
complicated and can be unclear. See generally DIANE E. THOMPSON & ELIZABETH RENUART,
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING 13-15 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining some of
the challenges associated with determining the effective date of provisions under Title XIV
of Dodd-Frank).
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January 21, 2013.74 Presently, the provisions in Dodd-Frank banning
YSPs are not yet effective.
C. Federal Reserve Board Finalizes Pre-Dodd-Frank Rulemaking
After Dodd-Frank was passed, but before the majority of
provisions under Title XIV became effective, the Fed published its Final
Rule amending loan originator compensation and steering practices."
The Fed exercised its authority under TILA to enact the Final Rule
before the Fed's regulatory authority transferred to the CFPB.7 6 The
Final Rule on loan originator compensation is slightly narrower and less
detailed than parallel provisions under Title XIV of Dodd-Frank. For
instance, Dodd-Frank's definition of loan originator is broader because
it includes those who advertise services traditionally associated with
loan originators, whereas the Final Rule does not.n The Fed
acknowledged that additional changes would be necessary to fully
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2010).
75. See Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,509 (Sept. 24, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226).
76. See id.
77. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1601 ("The term 'mortgage originator' - (A) means any
person who, for direct or indirect compensation or gain, or in the expectation of direct or
indirect compensation or gain - (i) takes a residential mortgage loan application; (ii) assists
a consumer in obtaining or applying to obtain a residential mortgage loan; or (iii) offers or
negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan; (B) includes any person who represents to
the public, through advertising or other means of communicating or providing information
(including the use of business cards, stationary, brochures, signs, rate lists, or other
promotional items), that such person can or will provide any of the activities described in
subparagraph (A); (C) does not include any person who is (i) not otherwise described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) and who performs purely administrative or clerical tasks on behalf
of a person who is described in any such subparagraph [. .. ] (E) does not include, with
respect to a residential mortgage loan, a person, estate, or trust that provides mortgage
financing for the sale of 3 properties in any 12-month period to purchasers of such
properties, each of which is owned by such person, estate or trust, and severs as security for
the loan, provided that such loan (i) is not made by a person, estate, or trust that has
constructed, or acted as a contractor for the construction of, a residence on the property in
the ordinary course of business of such person, estate, or trust; (ii) is fully amortizing; (iii) is
with respect to a sale for which the seller determines in good faith and documents that the
buyer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan; (iv) has a fixed rate or an adjustable rate
that is adjustable after 5 or more years, subject to reasonable annual and lifetime limitations
on interest rate increases; and (v) meets any other criteria the Board may prescribe; . . . .")
(emphasis added), with Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. at 58,533-34 ("For the purposes of this
section, the term 'loan originator' means with respect to a particular transaction, a person for
compensation or other monetary gain, or in expectation of compensation or other monetary
gain, arranges, negotiates, or otherwise obtains an extension of consumer credit for another
person . . . .").
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implement Title XIV of Dodd-Frank,' 8 but the Fed believed, given the
likely delay in the implementation of Dodd-Frank, that it would benefit
consumers to enact some restrictions on loan originator compensation
and steering practices as soon as possible.79
The Fed's Final Rule made significant and immediate changes
to mortgage broker compensation. Similar to Dodd-Frank's provisions,
the Final Rule prohibited the use of all YSPs,80 and prohibited dual-
payment of mortgage originator compensation.81  Following the
changes, mortgage brokers may receive compensation from the lender
or the borrower, but not both.82 In addition to restricting the source of
payments, the Final Rule requires that mortgage brokers present
borrowers with loan options for each type of loan borrower that
expresses an interest.83  The options presented to the consumer must
include the following: (1) the loan with the lowest interest rate; (2) the
loan with the lowest interest rate without any risky features;84 and (3)
the loan with the lowest dollar amount of fees including discount points,
and origination fees and points.85 Brokers must collect loan options
from a "significant number" of the creditors with whom they
"regularly" conduct business, and present loan options to the
consumer. 6 In the event that the broker presents more than three
options for each loan type, the broker must highlight the three loans the
78. See Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. at 58,509.
79. See id at 58,512 ("[T]he Board finds that the benefits to consumers of an earlier
effective date for rules pertaining to loan origination compensation and steering greatly
outweigh any potential savings [to members of the residential lending market].").
80. See id. at 58,534.
81. See id
82. See id. (requiring originators be paid by consumers or lenders, not both).
83. See id. ("[T]he term 'type of [loan]' refers to whether (i) A loan has an annual
percentage rate that cannot increase after consummation; (ii) A loan that has an annual
percentage rate that may increase after consummation; or (iii) A loan is a reverse
mortgage.").
84. Risky features include negative amortization, a pre-payment penalty, interest-only
payments, a balloon payment within the first seven years of the loan, a demand feature,
shared appreciation, or shared equity. In the case of consumer interest in a reverse mortgage,
the originator must provide the consumer with a loan without a prepayment penalty, shared
equity, or shared appreciation. See Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. at 58,534.
85. See id.
86. The regulation requires that the loan originator obtain "loan options from a
significant number of the creditors with which the originator regularly does business . . . ."
The terms "significant number" and "regularly does business" are not clearly defined in the
regulation or in the official staff interpretation. See id. at 58,534, 58,537-38.
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regulation requires. 87  Finally, the originator must have a good faith
belief that the consumer will likely qualify for all the loans presented.
It is unknown if the CFPB will require brokers to present options when
it implements the related provisions in Dodd-Frank.
III. CRITICisMS OF YSPs
In a perfectly transparent and informed market, mortgage
brokers would use YSPs for the benefit of consumers. 89 Indeed, HUD
extolled YSPs as a useful mechanism to foster homeownership. 90
However, there is compelling evidence that YSPs were used abusively,
hurting the homeowners associated. Consumer advocacy groups and
homebuyers protested their use, claiming that the practice created a
perverse incentive for brokers to offer loans to consumers above the
lowest rate a consumer could otherwise qualify. 9' Nevertheless, the
dangers associated with YSPs do not outweigh their utility, particularly
because most of the dangers can be easily treated while preserving the
benefits of YSPs.
A. Under Regulated and Overpriced
The YSP system was largely unregulated by HUD and
wholesale lenders.92 Without regulation or oversight, some mortgage
brokers charged unnecessarily high fees and wholesale lenders funded
these loans. Wholesale lenders delegated a lot of the decision-making
authority to individual mortgage brokers, including allowing individual
mortgage brokers to set their own compensation. 93 Even worse, lenders
87. Id. at 58,534.
88. Id.
89. See RESPA's 2001 Statement of Policy, supra note 11, at 53,054.
90. Id.
91. Lenders gave incentives to brokers who sold loans to consumers above the par rate,
thus creating a YSP for the mortgage broker and the borrower's mortgage had a higher rate
than they could otherwise receive. See SUSAN E. WOODWARD, THE URBAN INST., A STUDY
OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES 4 (2008),
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHA-closingcost.pdf [hereinafter STUDY OF
CLOSING COSTS].
92. See KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Steered Wrong: Brokers,
Borrowers, and Subprime Loans 4-6 (2008), available at http:I/
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/steered-wrong-brokers-borrowers-and-subprime-
loans.pdf (discussing brokers' pricing patterns).
93. Id. at 6, 8.
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gave incentives to brokers who sold loans to consumers above the par
rate-the higher the rate over par, the higher the YSP proceeds for the
mortgage broker.94
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is convincing evidence that, on
average, mortgage brokers charged consumers more than direct
lenders. 95 One study found that, all other things being equal, brokered
loans cost the consumer roughly $425 more than a mortgage loan from
a direct lender.96  Another study revealed even greater discrepancies,
finding evidence that consumers who borrow from non-bank lending
institutions pay interest rates two to four percent higher than those who
borrow from banks, thrifts, or credit unions without assistance from a
mortgage originator.97
B. Nondisclosure and Discrimination
According to RESPA, brokers were responsible for disclosing
YSPs to their customers on a HUD- 1 Settlement Statement." A HUD-1
Settlement Statement is a standardized form developed by HUD's
Secretary that itemizes all charges associated with a refinance or
purchase of a one-to-four family residential property. 99 The HUD-1
Statement was developed 00 to provide meaningful disclosure of costs
94. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 4 (finding that YSPs gave brokers
an incentive to charge consumers as much as possible).
95. See generally id at 53. This study examines 7,560 FHA-insured 30-year fixed rate
loans. The pool of loans includes loans for purchase of an owner occupied dwelling (no
refinances) and the loans were all originated in May and June of 2001. Id. at 2. The average
balance of these loans is just over 105,000. Id. The study gathered information from the
consumer's HUD-1 Settlement Statements and the FHA loan files, and analyzes how
borrower characteristics affects that type and cost of loan they receive. Id. at 1-2.
96. See id at 53. This study found that the simple difference between brokered loans
and non-brokered loans was $714 on average. However, after adjusting for the differences
in the two bodies of loans, the study concluded that brokers on average were charging their
borrowers $422 more than a substantially similar non-brokered loan.
97. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, How a Cognitive Bias Shapes Competition:
Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets, DARTMOUTH UNIVERSITY, 3 (Sept. 5, 2006),
http://www.dartmouth.edul-jzinman/Papers/Stango&ZirnanCognitiveBias&Competition.
pdf.
98. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500, app. B, para. 32 (2011) ("[A]ny other fee or payment
received by the mortgage broker from either the lender or the borrower arising from the
initial funding transaction, including a servicing release premium or yield spread premium is
to be noted on the Good Faith Estimate and listed in the 800 series of the HUD-1 Settlement
Statement.").
99. See id
100. The CFPB is in the process of redesigning and testing a new HUD-1 form to
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associated with a home purchase or refinancing.'" However, since
YSPs were paid directly to the broker, bypassing the borrower, it was
easy for brokers to fail to disclose a YSP accurately on the HUD-1
Statement or to rely entirely on the HUD-1 Statement to discharge the
duty of disclosure.
Before Dodd-Frank, experts believed the HUD-1 Statement had
significant potential for ineffective disclosure to borrowers for two
reasons: (1) there was very little oversight to monitor the accuracy of
reported YSPs;102 and (2) the manner of fee disclosure on the HUD- 1
Statement made it difficult for borrowers to understand the breakdown
of fees or to identify the presence of a YSP.103  Mortgage broker
compensation was disclosed on HUD-1 Statements, but the total
compensation was split between various fees, sometimes as many as
thirty-two separate feeS. 104 For instance, mortgage broker compensation
frequently includes fees called origination fees, commitment fees, and
application fees. 05 Experts contend that borrowers, many of whom will
only buy one or two homes during their lifetime, were not in a position
to understand which of these fees were mandatory or negotiable, and
which fees were compensation to the broker or otherwise.'06 This
information disparity created an environment where mortgage brokers
could take advantage of less informed buyers.' 0 7
YSP disclosure on the HUD-1 Statement was particularly
problematic because of how it was disclosed on the form. YSPs were
disclosed in Block 2, in a box entitled "credit." 08 The term "yield
spread premium" or "YSP" did not appear on the HUD-1 Statement at
improve disclosure. See Know Before You Owe: Mortgages, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
101. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8 (2011).
102. Diagnosing Consumer Confusion, supra note 20, at 15.
103. See id at 11.
104. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 3 (finding that there were thirty-
two standard categories of fees, but thousands of additional categories of charges in
residential home transactions).
105. See id at 12.
106. See id
107. See id
108. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL,
PT. 2 REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 7 (2011), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-
content/themes/cfpbtheme/images/supervision examination.manual_ 121 1.pdf.
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all. 109 For instance, if the loan had a YSP then that amount of YSP
would appear in the "credit" box as a negative number.no Following
the closing, the lender paid the YSP directly to the broker without any
other disclosure or notice to the borrower. Even a well-informed
borrower, looking specifically for a YSP on the HUD-1 Statement
would have difficulty locating it, and even if discovered, some
commentators suggest that a borrower would not have wanted to protest
its presence or do anything that might delay their closing."' In short,
YSP disclosure on the HUD-1 Statement was ineffective.
The potential for discrimination was an additional concern
regarding YSPs.11 2 A recent study revealed that, all other factors
constant, the brokered loans of Latino borrowers cost $1,043 more than
loans for similarly situated non-Latino borrowers working with a
mortgage broker, and African American spent $756 more than non-
African American buyers."13 The education bias was even higher than
race-based biases;"l 4 consumers with at least a bachelor's degree paid
$1,500 less than those who did not have equivalent education when
working with a mortgage broker."5 In the absence of federal regulatory
oversight, wholesale lender oversight was not sufficient to protect
consumers from the abusive use of YSPs by some mortgage brokers." 6
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 83-84.
112. See Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-
Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REv. 677, 694 (2009) (providing expert opinion of the
likelihood of discrimination when minority borrowers used mortgage brokers).
113. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 43-45.
114. See id. In the study, researchers found that consumers with at least a bachelor's
degree paid S1,500 less than those who did not have equivalent education. The education
bias was three times that of the bias present for ($756) African American buyers compared
to non-African American buyers. Latino borrowers' bias was $1,043. In addition to
different rates, minority and less educated borrowers experienced other risky terms. The
author says that even within one company rates differ based on the channel you work with,
perhaps because they are targeting areas that traditionally have more difficulty with direct
lenders or maybe because nobody else will lend to this area, a disadvantaged borrower may
accept anything they are offered because they believe it is better than nothing.
115. See id.
116. See supra Part III.B.
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C. Complicated Loans versus Simple Loans
In a fully informed market, one would expect that consumers
would receive a dollar-for-dollar trade-off for either method of
compensation and that consumers would pick the most convenient and
economical method of compensating their broker.1 7 However, a recent
study revealed that an increase in YSP did not correlate with a decrease
in upfront cash payments." 8 Instead, there was a positive correlation
between YSP and upfront costs; as YSP increased, upfront costs
increased as well.1 9 This was the exact opposite relationship one would
expect to find if YSPs were used as a means to reduce upfront costs.120
Choosing between paying higher costs upfront or deferring
those costs and paying a higher monthly payment is not analytically
difficult for borrowers to understand.121 The difficulty lies in knowing
exactly how much of a monthly payment is appropriate to offset a
specific reduction in upfront costs.122 Compounding this problem is the
tendency of consumers to underestimate the long-term effect of an
increase in interest rate,123 and many borrowers mistakenly believe that
a broker will find the best deal for the borrower.' 24
Evidence supports the finding that consumers are ill-equipped to
identify a bad deal when using a dual method of compensation.12 5 A
recent study found that borrowers with no-cost loans (where the broker
receives only a YSP) saved $1,200 on average compared to borrowers
who split costs between a YSP and an upfront payment.126 Another
study found a slightly greater discrepancy in their sample of FHA loans,
placing the difference between a no-cost loan and a loan that splits costs
at $1,493.127
Researchers believe that borrowers with no-cost loans get better
117. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTs, supra note 91, at 24.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id
120. See id at 28-29.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. See Stango & Zinman, supra note 97, at 3.
124. See Diagnosing Consumer Confusion, supra note 20, at 29.
125. Id. at 32.
126. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 73.
127. Diagnosing Consumer Confusion, supra note 20, at 32.
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deals because borrowers can more easily compare and negotiate the
terms of their loan. 128 No-cost loans are easier to compare because
consumers only have to consider one factor-the increase in their rate.129
On the other hand, a complicated loan using a dual payment method
requires consumers to consider both the YSP and interest rate. Even
better, these no-cost loans revealed almost no race or education bias.'3 0
IV. WHY THE CFPB SHOULD RECONSIDER COMPENSATION REGULATION
Mortgage brokers have existed in some capacity since the turn
of the nineteenth century, but it was not until the 1970s that brokers
achieved importance in the residential mortgage market.' 3 ' By 2001,
mortgage brokers originated sixty-five percent of the residential
mortgage loans. 132 Clearly, brokers are a significant part of the modern
residential real estate market, and they offer a service that continues to
attract customers. However, between 2006 and 2010, more than
100,000 mortgage brokers left their jobs.133 The decreased demand for
mortgage origination accounts for much of the decline, but the change
in compensation is also a significant contributing factor to the flight of
brokers. 134  The CFPB should reconsider the rigid prohibitions on
broker compensation and YSPs because these changes eliminate a
mortgage broker's flexibility to structure borrower's closing costs and
128. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 14-15.
129. See id. at 70.
130. Id. at 70-71, 73.
131. See Alex Nackoul, Mortgage Brokering: A Short History (Part 1 of 2), SCOTSMAN
GUIDE (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.scotsmanguide.com/default.asp?ID=1299
(discussing Sonnenblick-Goldman, one of the first mortgage brokerages, founded in New
York in 1893).
132. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH , U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR RESPA
PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING MORTGAGES TO
REDUCE SETTLEMENT COSTS TO CONSUMERS 12 (2002) (estimating that by 2001 mortgage
brokers occupied sixty-five percent of the market).
133. The article mentions other dramatic reductions in the number of mortgage brokers
in Oregon, Illinois, Florida, and Washington. See Marunde, supra note 27 ("The National
Association of Realtors recently announced they lost more than 100,000 members since
2006."); Mary Ellen Podmolik, Mortgage Brokers Ditching Day Jobs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31,
2008, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008- 10-
3 1/entertainment/0810290871 1 metrocities-mortgage-llc-wholesale-lending-loan-
originations (statement by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation)
(finding that between 2005 to 2008 the number brokers licensed in Illinois fell thirty-one
percent, from 2,308 to 1,593, and brokers continue to exit the market daily).
134. See Podmolik, supra note 133.
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unnecessarily restrict a consumer's choices. 135  Additionally, the
changes may make it more difficult for borrowers who need extra
attention to find a broker willing to work with them, place
homeownership outside the reach of some qualified consumers,136 and
further stifle an already lethargic mortgage market.137  Dodd-Frank
created barriers for mortgage brokers seeking to enter the market and
established procedures for nationwide oversight further reducing the
danger posed to consumers.138
One of Dodd-Frank's goals is to protect consumers from unfair
or abusive practices without inhibiting responsible and sustainable
lending practices.139  So long as YSPs are not used in an unfair or
abusive manner, there is little need to ban them because, according to
HUD, YSPs foster homeownership.14 0 The CFPB should exercise its
explicit authority to modify laws relating to YSPs and mortgage broker
compensation. 141
A. Changes Reduce Mortgage Broker Flexibility
Prior to the changes to loan originator compensation, a
mortgage broker could offer consumers a number of choices in
financing.142  Following the changes, these options are significantly
135. See infra Part IV.A.
136. See infra Part IV.C.
137. See Charles Hugh Smith, New Mortgage Regulations Could Bruise Housing
Market, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/03/23/new-mortgage-regulations-could-hurt-housing/
(statement of Mark Helling, a licensed loan officer based in Ohio) ("After April Ist, a loan
officer will have to be paid the same rate whether it is an easy loan that takes two weeks to
close or a foreclosed property in need of rehabbing for marginal borrowers that takes three
months of work to close. Just when the country need the most experienced and
knowledgeable mortgage professionals to help liquidate the flood of foreclosed homes, the
Fed is making it unprofitable for loan officers to accept these deals.").
138. See infra Part IV.B.
139. See Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 58,509 (Sept. 24, 2010) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
140. See RESPA's 2001 Statement of Policy, supra note 11, at 53,054.
141. Congress prohibited YSPs and dual compensation structures and in the very same
breath gave the CFPB authority to limit or waive these prohibitions. See 15 U.S.C. §
1639b(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) ("[T]he Bureau may, by rule, waive or provide exemptions
to this clause if the Bureau determines that such waiver or exemption is in the interest of
consumers and in the public interest.").
142. See Fixing What Isn't Broken, supra note 25.
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limited.143 Consider the following example:
Assume that the loan is a $200,000, standard 30-year fixed-rate
loan, with an interest rate at 5%, and that each .25% increase in interest
rate yields a YSP that is 1% ($2,000) of the loan balance. Also, assume
that the broker and homebuyer agree on a 1.5% ($3,000) commission
for the mortgage broker. Before the Fed's Final Rule and Dodd-Frank,
a mortgage broker could offer the following options to a borrower: (1)
lock in at the 5.0% rate-the lender would pay none of the broker's
commission, and the borrower would pay the entire 1.5% ($3,000)
commission to the broker; (2) lock the interest rate at 5.125 0/-the
lender would pay a 0.5% YSP ($1,000), and the borrower would be
responsible for the remainder of the broker's commission, 1.0%
($2,000); (3) lock the rate at 5.25%-the lender would pay a 1.0% YSP
($2,000) and the borrower would be responsible for the remaining 0.5%
compensation ($1,000); (4) lock the rate at 5.375%-the lender would
pay the broker's entire commission of 1.5% ($3,000) and the borrower
would owe no additional compensation to the broker; or (5) lock the
rate at 5.5%-the lender would pay the broker 2.0% YSP ($4,000), the
broker would take a 1.5% commission ($3,000) and return the 0.5%
YSP ($1,000) to the borrower as a credit. 144 Following the changes to
broker compensation, only options (1), (4), and (5) are authorized under
Dodd-Frank. Experts note that option (1) is not favored by many
consumers.145 Elimination of options (2) and (3) leaves consumers with
the decision of paying their mortgage broker's compensation in full at
closing or amortizing their loan at an elevated rate that reflects such
compensation.146
Many borrowers may find options (2) and (3) convenient and
economical ways to compensate their mortgage broker.147 In fact, a
recent study of FHA thirty-year fixed-rate loans originated over six
weeks in 2000 indicated that about half of the consumers took
advantage of the dual method of compensation, paying some cash at
closing and deferring the rest of their payment through a YSP;148 when a
YSP was used it was typically the largest component of a mortgage
143. See id.
144. See id
145. See id.
146. See id
147. Diagnosing Consumer Confusion, supra note 20, at 5.
148. Id.
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broker's compensation.14 9  Restricting these options to protect
consumers forecloses the benefits the option offers. As long as there are
effective ways to protect consumers without limiting their access to
credit or inhibiting their choices regarding broker fee financing, the
CFPB should preserve consumer choice in the mortgage market
particularly because the availability of these options promotes greater
access to homeownership. s0
B. Most "Fly-By-Nighters" Are Already Gone
Following the mortgage crisis, the residential real estate and
mortgage market experienced a litany of changes including national
licensing requirements for originators151 and more accurate disclosures
of good faith estimates. 152  Experts suggest that as demand for
residential mortgage origination decreased and broker regulation
increased, the market was no longer appealing to unscrupulous brokers,
who appeared during the mortgage boom to make quick money.15 ' The
mass exit of brokers, 154 some believe, will result in better brokers with
more experience and cleaner records, and that these changes will result
in better service for consumers.15 5 Those brokers that left the market
will have a difficult time reentering when mortgage demand increases
because of the educational requirements mortgage brokers are now
required to satisfy, including a national licensing exam. 15 6  Also,
NMLS's database is available online for consumers to find licensing,
educational, and soon, disciplinary information to aid in their selection
of a mortgage broker.157  This database will make mortgage brokers
more accountable and give consumers tools they need to avoid bad
149. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 292.
150. RESPA's 2001 Statement of Policy, supra note 11, at 53,504 ("The availability of
[a YSP] fosters homeownership.").
151. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010) (transferring authority from federal bank
regulators to the CFPB).
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See Marunde, supra note 27; Sichelman, supra note 27.
154. See Sichelman, supra note 27 (estimating that the number of individuals and
companies in the mortgage broker business has decreased by a whopping fifty percent).
155. See id.; Marunde, supra note 27.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 5104(c)-(d) (Supp. IV 2010); see Sichelman, supra note 27 (stating
that NMLS 'has created a strong barrier to entry . .. that will make for a stronger industry
in the long run."').
157. See supra Part II.B.
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brokers.
In the post-mortgage crisis environment, some in the industry
are marketing themselves as honest mortgage brokers, employing
transparent and consumer friendly broker-buyer agreements to eliminate
consumer worry about steering.158 For example, at UpFront Mortgage
Brokers Association (UpFront),159 the compensation agreements are
negotiated before service is rendered, eliminating temptation to put
consumers in loans that are not ideal for them.' 60 Also, UpFront brokers
agree to abide by UpFront's Mortgage Broker Commitment.161 The
commitment requires brokers to work in the consumer's best interest,
give full and complete disclosure of all broker fees received from
borrowers and third parties, and brokers must disclose wholesale and
marked up rates. 162 Indeed, with heightened standards of entry into the
mortgage broker business and organizations like UpFront, it appears
that there are still some "good apples in the mortgage industry."' 63
C. Difficulty Finding a Broker and Further Damage to the
Mortgage Market
To the extent that Dodd-Frank imposes limits on points and fees
for Qualified Mortgages,1 64 brokers will have incentive to help only
those borrowers with the strongest applications. These borrowers are
most likely to qualify and quickly close with minimal effort on the
broker's behalf. Before the changes to broker compensation, HUD
allowed brokers to charge higher fees on loans that required greater
work. 165 The increase in compensation serves to offset the expenses
158. See UPFRONT MORTGAGE BROKERS, UPFRONT MORTGAGE BROKERS
INFORMATIONAL BROCHURE, [hereinafter UPFRONT BROCHURE], available at
http://www.upfrontmortgagebrokers.org/docs/UMBInformationalBrochure.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2012).
159. See generally About UMBA, UPFRONT MORTGAGE BROKERS,
http://www.upfrontmortgagebrokers.org/what is umba.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2011)
(stating that UpFront Mortgage Brokers Association, formed in August 2006, seeks to align
the interests of borrowers and brokers by educating borrowers and negotiating fees at the
beginning of the mortgage searching process to avoid broker steering).
160. See UPFRONT BROCHURE, supra note 158.
161. About UMBA, supra note 159.
162. See UPFRONT BROCHURE, supra note 158.
163. See id.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (Supp. IV 2010).
165. RESPA's 2001 Statement of Policy, supra note 11, at 53,055.
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associated with qualifying a borrower with an imperfect credit
application or a property requiring more attention, thus making it
economically feasible for a mortgage broker to help almost any
borrower.166  Critics contend that the rigid cap on mortgage broker
compensation will make labor-intensive loans unprofitable and prevent
borrowers who require more attention or extra work from finding a
broker willing to work with them.167  Any unwillingness to process
difficult loans is concerning with so many vacant foreclosed properties
available following the mortgage crisis.
D. The YSP Ban is Inconsistent with RESPA and Dodd-Frank
RESPA has always maintained that the best way to control
closing costs is through an indirect approach, rather than a flat fee or
fixed calculation.168 To the extent that lenders respond to the strong
regulatory incentives to discontinue risky loan products, and offer only
Qualified Mortgages, fees for mortgage brokers will be limited by the
three percent cap for all fees associated with a Qualified Mortgage.169
This three percent cap on all fees runs directly counter to RESPA's
preference for indirect control of costs.170  More importantly,
prohibiting YSPs directly conflicts with Dodd-Frank's aim of helping
consumers. Dodd-Frank expressly seeks to protect consumers from
abusive practices that helped cause the mortgage crisis. However, by
banning YSPs, Dodd-Frank hurts those same consumers by taking away
some of their options for home financing.
V. A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO RIGID YSP REGULATION
During the last several years, trade organizations, consumer
protection agencies, and regulatory agencies have proffered numerous
alternatives to protect consumers from abusive lending practices. Some
of these proposals include: (1) mortgage industry self-regulation;17 1 (2)
166. Id.
167. See Smith, supra note 137.
168. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 298.
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (Supp. IV 2010).
170. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 10, at 298.
171. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to
Credit: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, and the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 37 (2003) (statement of A.W.
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increasing state and federal broker regulation;172 (3) imposing a
fiduciary duty on brokers;' 7 3  (4) regulating products in lieu of
compensation regulation;1 74 and (5) increasing the number of borrowers
required to seek consumer debt counseling.'75 However, many of these
solutions are problematic or burdensome to the industry. For example,
mortgage industry self-regulation may not provide strong enough
protection for borrowers, mortgage brokers strongly oppose a fiduciary
duty imposed upon them, and there are significant costs associated with
debt counseling programs.
A study in the automotive industry involving two different
promotions may provide a model for inexpensive and effective YSP
regulation reform. The study found that, in negotiations, the party with
more information generally received a better deal than the party with
less information. 176 In the study, there were two separate groups of car
salespeople and promotions.17 7 The first promotion was a $1,000 rebate
from the auto manufacturer to the consumer if the consumer purchased
one of the manufacturer's automobiles.178  In this scenario, both
negotiating parties, the consumer and the salesperson, knew about the
promotional offer.179 As to the second promotion, the manufacturer
offered a $1,000 rebate to the seller for each automobile sold.'"0 In this
second scenario, only the salesperson knew about the promotion; the
Pickel, 111, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
172. See Stango & Zinman, supra note 97, at 4 (suggesting that perhaps traditional
lenders are less willing to exploit customer confusion because they are heavily regulated
whereas, non-regulated entities, like brokers and broker firms, are less regulated and more
willing to exploit consumer confusion in their pricing).
173. See Solutions to the Mortgage Lending Crisis, NAT'L Ass'N OF MORTGAGE
FIDUCIARIES (June 12, 2008), http://mortgagefiduciaries.com/2008/06/solutions-to-the-
mortgage-lending-crisis (suggesting brokers adopt a fiduciary role to align the interests of
the broker and consumer).
174. See Amy Hoak, New Rules for Home-Loan Brokers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704302704576253453390061280.html.
175. See STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 91, at 20 (suggesting that additional
studies are warranted before dismissing the value of debt counseling).
176. See id at 35; Meghan Busse et al., $1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto
Manufacture Promotions, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 1253, 1254 (2006) (discussing the effect of
information asymmetry and its influence on the relative bargaining powers of parties).
177. See Busse et al., supra note 176, at 1254.
178. See id. at 1263.
179. See id ("One striking difference between customer cash and dealer cash is that the
two bargaining parties are symmetrically informed about customer case, while the customer
is typically uninformed about dealer cash.").
180. See id
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buyer was not aware of the incentive to sell that particular
manufacturer's car.' ' When the consumer knew about the rebate, they
received far more of the benefit; seventy to ninety percent of the rebate
was passed to the consumer, compared to only thirty to forty percent of
the amount of the rebate when only the salesperson knew about the
rebate in negotiations.' 82
If we analogize the findings of the auto rebate study to YSPs,
we find that consumers who understand the compensation structure are
more likely to receive a better deal when compared to borrowers who
do not understand the broker's incentives.183 If YSP payments were
paid directly to the borrower from the lender it would ensure that
borrowers were aware of the presence of a YSP on their loan, that they
would receive full disclosure regarding the YSP, and that borrowers
know how much compensation their broker received in total
compensation. Furthermore, it would eliminate the potential for broker
abuse of the YSP system, and it would preserve consumer flexibility in
mortgage broker compensation. Following the disbursement of any
YSP, the borrower could use the proceeds for any purpose, including
compensating their broker.
Applying this practice, a regulation restricting YSPs would be
unnecessary because the potential for abuse would be nearly non-
existent. The issues associated with non-disclosure or faulty disclosure
and overpricing of the YSP could be corrected by funneling the
payment through the borrower, rather than the broker. Moreover, the
direct rate restrictions disfavored by RESPA, but imposed by Dodd-
Frank, would be unnecessary because broker compensation, which
accounts for more than half of the average fees and costs associated
with a loan closing, would be fully and effectively disclosed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reducing mortgage broker abuses and protecting residential
homebuyer are important goals. The ban on YSPs and dual
compensation, however, does more harm to consumers than
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See supra Part III.C.
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necessary.' 84 Eliminating YSPs following the mortgage crisis was an
unnecessary overreaction. Focusing on improving disclosure and
eliminating consumer confusion will solve the most significant
problems associated with YSPs and preserve the benefits of dual-
compensation for future consumers.' 5 Eliminating the YSP prohibition
is entirely possible at this time,'86 but a failure of the CFPB to consider
the advantages of YSPs will result in negative effects within the
residential mortgage market.'8 7  So long as there are sufficient
safeguards in place to protect consumers, the CFPB should lift the ban
on YSPs and dual-compensation.
NICOLE M. OLVERA
184. See supra Part IV.
185. See supra Part III.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (granting authority to the CFPB to
waive or create exemptions to the YSP prohibition).
187. See supra Part IV.
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